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Abstract: 
Proponents of financial liberalization argue that deregulation motivates bankers to increase 
their effort and operate at a higher level of efficiency and productivity. Sceptics, however, see 
that liberalization engenders economic instability and banking crises, and impedes growth. 
Bank efficiency and productivity, following liberalization, have been extensively examined. 
Nonetheless, the core issue of bankers’ self-motivation remains implicitly assumed and 
unaddressed. Does liberalization self-motivate bankers and increase their efforts and 
productivity? This paper models bank productivity from this perspective and evaluates what 
proportion of banks’ total factor productivity is accounted for by the self-motivated productivity 
of bankers. We provide a micro-founded framework for the analyses of bankers’ optimal level 
of effort and effort-driven productivity. Our model also captures banks’ unit input-output 
prices, optimal wages, bank spread and the overall cost of bank services – measures that are 
important in evaluating reform policies. We assess the financial liberalization of Nepal as a test 
case and find that (i) bankers’ efforts and productivity have notably improved in Nepal, 
although banking services have become costly, and (ii) bank spread has moderately declined in 
recent years. Our approach is parametric which differs from DEA, hence complements the 
literature. We hope this analytical framework will be useful to evaluate reform episodes 
elsewhere. 
JEL Codes: G21, G28, O43, O53. 
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Liberalization, Bankers’ Motivation and Productivity: A Simple Model with 
an Application 
1. Introduction 
The world has seen sustained financial liberalization, increasing privatization 
and gradual loosening of capital controls since the mid-1990s. The economic thinking 
behind all this is that the financial entities, functioning under liberalized financial 
regimes, operate at higher levels of efficiency and productivity. Productivity 
improvements may ensue from different sources yet the notion that the private – i.e. the 
individual institution’s – motive to maximize profit leads to productivity improvement 
is one of the fundamental ones. Put differently, a deregulated financial system is viewed 
as motivating institutions (in this instance banks) for higher levels of effort, productivity 
and profitability. Further, liberalization and deregulation is advocated to create a more 
integrated and competitive banking sector ensuring efficient allocation of bank credits 
to productive sectors. 
These assertions made in favour of liberalization and deregulation have not gone 
unchallenged however. For example, Dell’Ariccia and Marqueze (2004), analysing the 
effect of foreign entry on credit reallocation following liberalization, show that the entry 
of fiercely competitive foreign banks may push local banks’ lending portfolio towards 
low quality and high risk local borrowers. In their model the degree of information 
asymmetry affects bank credit allocation; and, liberalization is shown to result in credit 
market segmentations between foreign and domestic banks – an outcome certainly 
against the intended motives of deregulation. Likewise, Gehrig (1998), analysing 
cartelized banks, shows that financial market integration – especially in countries with 
a lower degree of credit market fragmentation, e.g., Europe – could worsen aggregate 
loan quality and increase systemic risks, which aggravate aggregate risk and poor credit 
allocation. Outcomes for emerging countries, where credit market fragmentation could 
be high, are likely to be positive however. In short, at the theoretical level, doubts have 
been raised on the potential benefits advocated by the proponents of banking 
liberalization and deregulation. 
Empirically, the effects of financial liberalization and bank deregulation have 
been researched quite extensively on various fronts: growth, productivity and bank 
efficiency. For example, Bekaert et al. (2005), Mishkin (2008), Levchenko et al. (2009),  
Belke et al. (2016), to name but a few, report that the effects of financial liberalization 
on financial depth and economic growth have largely been positive. In contrast, Diaz-
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Alejandro (1985), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1999), Kose et al. (2003), Ahmed (2013), among others, report that liberalization has 
contributed to economic instability, banking crisis and stalled growth. However, Hamdi 
and Jlassi (2014), analysing 58 developing countries, do not find evidence of 
liberalization contributing to economic instability and banking crisis. In a nutshell, 
empirical evidence on the effects of financial liberalization on growth, economic 
stability and banking crises is rather mixed.  
A strand of literature (Fare et al., 1994; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 1999; Tirtiroglu et al., 2005; Pasiouras, 2008; Brissimis et al., 2009; Delis 
et al., 2011; to name but a few) examines bank efficiency and productivity following 
reforms and regulatory changes. They are panel as well as country-specific studies 
which mostly employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to compute 
various efficiency decompositions – technical efficiency, scale efficiency, efficiency 
change (catching up or falling behind) – and productivity growth.1 This is an extremely 
rich body of literature conducting rigorous empirical analyses and offering evidence if 
deregulations and reforms have worked, i.e. if reforms had a positive effect on banking 
efficiency and productivity. Again, the overall evidence is mixed: bank efficiency and 
productivity have improved following deregulation in some countries but not in others. 
One common theme (implicit assumption) across all empirical studies (cited 
above) − as well as the premise of financial liberalization − is that, following 
liberalization, financial institutions (banks) become self-motivated to improve their 
productivity and profitability. The anticipation is that reforms and liberalization avail 
opportunities to optimize, and bankers react by increasing their efforts and productivity. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature, so far, does not grapple with the 
issues of bankers’ self-motivated efforts following liberalization. Do bankers react by 
increasing their effort following liberalization? Does their self-motivated effort lead to 
increase in banking sector productivity? The effects of financial deregulation on 
bankers’ motivation, banking sector productivity and the cost of bank services (unit 
price of bank output) are important policy issues.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by analysing, among other things, 
bankers’ optimal efforts (self-motivated incentive) and effort-driven productivity 
following deregulations and reforms. Our objectives are twofold. First, we develop a 
theoretical model of bankers’ optimal level of effort and effort-driven productivity 
applicable under a liberalized environment; it is hoped that our model serves as a simple 
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yet general framework for assessing such issues. Second, as a test case, we implement 
(estimate and simulate) our proposed model to assess the effects of financial 
liberalization in Nepal.  
Our contribution to the literature is that our approach differs from DEA in that 
we model banks as profit-cum-utility maximizing firms. We directly model bankers’ 
optimal level of productivity rather than relative productivity, as is done under DEA. A 
conceptual clarity is worth emphasizing. Throughout the paper, we use bankers’ 
incentive or motivation in the sense of bankers’ self-motivated response (efforts) to 
optimize productivity and profitability following liberalization. This is precisely the 
raison d’être of financial liberalization and reforms. We do not imply incentive in the 
sense of bankers’ compensation packages. The literature outside of the banking area 
documents that reforms-led private incentive (effort) is key in enhancing productivity 
and growth. McMillan et al. (1989) examine the case of Chinese agricultural reforms 
that replaced “communal decision making” by the “responsibility system” which 
incentivized (rewarded) individual farmers. The Chinese agriculture sector grew by 
61% between 1978 and 1984 and McMillan et al. (ibid.) attribute 78% of productivity 
gains to the strengthened individual incentives following reforms; they state “rewarding 
individual effort yields large benefit” (ibid., p 783). In this context, a related and 
pertinent question would be to ask if financial liberalization and banking deregulation 
motivate bankers to increase their efforts and productivity accordingly. We model 
bankers’ efforts and effort-driven productivity in the spirit of McMillan et al (ibid.). We 
focus on three fundamental issues: (i) whether bankers have become self-motivated and 
increased their levels of effort in augmenting banking sector productivity, (ii) whether 
banking sector productivity has increased, and (iii) what has been the impact of 
liberalization on bank spread (the difference between banks’ input and output unit 
prices) and the overall cost of banking services.  
Our theoretical model combines banks’ production technology with their 
optimizing behaviour. Banks’ technical production function is that of the Cobb-
Douglas technology which is standard in the literature (Clark, 1984, 1988; Humphrey, 
1991). We augment banks’ technical production function by effort and risk parameters. 
We derive banks’ optimal feasible production function, which embeds banks’ profit-
cum-utility maximizing optimal levels of effort following liberalization. In this setup, 
banking sector productivity becomes endogenous to bankers’ optimal level of effort, 
relative input-output prices and some technical and risk parameters.  
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As a test case, we use our model to scrutinize Nepalese financial liberalization 
and reforms by employing cutting-edge econometric methods, calibrations and 
simulations. Nepal is one of the least developed and poorest countries of the world 
which went through deep financial sector reform from 1992-1994. However, due to 
Maoists’ armed insurgency (People’s War) starting in 1996, economic and financial 
activities were largely dormant until Maoists entered into dialogue for peace in 2000. 
Financial activities soared post-2000 exploiting the liberal regime and ushering 
fundamental changes into the country’s financial sector (see Section 3). This makes the 
Nepalese banking sector an interesting test case as to whether financial reforms have 
produced anticipated productivity improvements. 
We find that bankers’ optimal level of effort, optimal bank productivity and 
bank profitability have considerably improved in Nepal following financial 
liberalization. Formal tests show that bankers’ efforts significantly explain bank 
productivity. We also find that in recent years the bank spread has slightly reduced, 
indicating competitive pressure, yet banking services have become more costly (higher 
unit price of bank output). On the whole, financial reforms and liberalization appear to 
have been a fruitful experience in Nepal.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We present our analytical model 
in the following section; Section 3 briefly outlines the financial regimes of Nepal and 
argues why Nepal is an interesting test case; econometric specification and data are 
discussed in Section 4; empirical methodologies are discussed in Section 5; empirical 
results are presented in Section 6; calibrations and simulation of optimal effort and 
productivity are discussed in Section 7; and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model 
Financial liberalization, among other things, frees prices. Interest (deposit and 
lending) rates, bankers’ wages, CEOs’ pay and other incentives, such as bonuses, are 
competitively determined but there are always entry and exit restrictions in the banking 
industry. These restrictions are maintained by the Central Bank which may be 
motivated by its concerns over financial fragility and/or some notional optimal size of 
the banking industry in the economy. Restrictions to entry and exit have important 
implications because they allow banks to earn positive economic profits, even in the 
long run.  
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We construct a partial equilibrium model where a representative banker, 
following liberalization, operates within a competitive environment and minimizes its 
cost function to achieve the maximum feasible level of profit.2 The representative 
banker is a decision making unit (DMU) and has full flexibility and freedom in decision 
making.  
In order to model banking sector productivity, we need to specify banks’ 
production function. There are alternative ways to measure bank inputs and output in 
the literature. Prominent ones are the production approach (Berger and Humphrey, 
1992) and the intermediation approach (Sealy and Lindley, 1997; Aly et al., 1990; 
Delis et al., 2011). As in Wheelock and Wilson (1999), “a mutually exclusive 
distinction” between inputs and output is vital for modelling productivity, hence we 
follow the intermediation approach. We specify that banks use three inputs, namely, 
labour (banking hours of staff, N), total fixed assets (F), and total deposits (D) to 
produce their output (Q). Labour is measured by the number of hours devoted to provide 
banking services; total fixed assets is the book value of premises and other fixed assets, 
which is equivalent to physical capital stock. Fixed assets for a bank include premises, 
land, assets on lease and furniture, fixtures and fittings. Deposits are the total deposit 
liabilities. Bank output is measured by total credits and investment.3 We specify a 
technical constant returns to scale (CRTS) Cobb-Douglas production function for bank 
output as:        1 2 30 (1)a a aQ a N F D   
where   ,00a ; [0,1], 1, 2,3ia i  are the share parameters such that 31 1i ia . N is 
the self-motivated incentive (effort) augmented labour hours and 0a captures the 
banking technology. The parameter denotes the level of effort or the level of self-
motivation of a representative banker which may change in response to changes in 
policies. The idea is that, following liberalization, bankers become more motivated and 
increase their level of effort (quality of work). Bankers’ efforts may include their 
willingness to embark on new types of lending, investments and services which might 
have been restricted and/or barred hitherto. It is plausible to think that the quality of N 
and F may also improve due to the hiring of more qualified staff, more efficient 
utilization of working hours, computerization and the opening up of new branches in 
more strategic locations. We assume the quality of inputs and the level of effort to be 
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positively correlated. In other words, bankers invest in quality inputs in order to 
increase their effort level (or make their effort more effective). 
The term   in (1) captures banks’ levels of risk following liberalization. The 
general perception is that deregulation increases banks’ risks. However, conceptually 
the level of risk could go either way – an aggressive lending by the banker, following 
liberalization, may increase the level of risk, whereas a prudent lending may do just the 
opposite. Since our focus is on the outcome of liberalization and deregulation – i.e. 
whether reforms motivated bankers and increased banking sector productivity – the 
analysis is essentially an ex post one. Hence, we can conveniently sidestep the issue of 
uncertainty and capture the level of bank risk exposure through the ratio of performing 
to total loans; the   term precisely captures this. The higher the  the lower tends to 
be the risk exposure and vice versa. Given that the production function (1) is 
homogeneous of degree one, the inclusion of   simply scales the productivity. A high 
proportion of non-performing loans implies 0 , which scales down the total factor 
productivity; whereas a high proportion of performing loans entails 1  and scales 
the productivity up; when non-performing loans are zero then 1 . 
We assume that there exists a continuum of identical bankers who own the 
banking technology specified in (1). This approach to modelling the banking production 
function is analogous to the representative agent model contained in Gillman and Kejak 
(2011). The bankers spend N hours in banking; their effort augmented labour input to 
producing output is ( N ), for which they earn wages. From (1), the production function 
in per-banking hour terms can be expressed as:        1 2 30 (2)a a aq a f d   
where q , f , and d  represent output, total fixed assets and total deposit per-banking 
hour, respectively. The representative banker chooses the level of inputs, such that the 
total cost  TC  of renting these inputs (i.e. the opportunity cost of owning these factors) 
is minimized. Let us denote the unit cost of these three inputs by 3,2,1, iwi . The 
banker chooses the input set ( N , F and D ) in order to minimize:        )3(321 DwFwNwTC    
The consolidated first order condition associated with this cost minimization problem, 
subject to (1), is: 
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      )4(
3
3
2
2
1
1
Qa
Dw
Qa
Fw
Qa
Nw   
Equation (4) is the standard result in cost minimization, which states that the ratio of 
marginal cost to marginal revenue or its reciprocal should be the same across all the 
inputs employed. Substituting (4) into (3) and imposing the CRTS condition, with some 
algebraic manipulation, the optimal total cost function is given by: 
* (5)iai
i
TC w Q       
where   31 20 1 2 31 aa aa a a a  . *TC  is the minimum value function of TC  in (3) subject 
to (1) which depends on unit input costs, the level of output and share parameters. The 
optimum cost of production per banking hour is therefore: 
* (6)iai
i
tc w q       
Let p  denote the market-clearing price per unit of credit. Then, the total revenue per 
banking hour is: 
(7)tr pq  
Input and output prices that banks face tend to differ and they are likely to change 
differently following liberalization. We capture this by
p
w
i
a
i
i , the ratio of the 
observed weighted input to output prices. From (6) and (7) and utilizing , the profit 
per banking hour is given by:   )8(1 qp    
The bank’s profit is defined by      DwFwNwpQ 321   . Since the 
representative banker is a cost minimizer, the cost minimizing level of wages in 
equilibrium is:
N
Q
paw 11  . The total wage income earned by the representative banker 
is:   pQaNw 11  . Dividing both sides of this (last) expression by the total number of 
hours spent in banking, N , gives the effort augmented banker’s wage rate per hour as, 
pqaw 11  . The representative banker likes income, which is the sum of profits and 
wages, but dislikes effort. He is mindful of the trade-off between income and the utility 
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cost of effort. The banker’s utility from working in the bank is defined over profit and 
wage income and effort levels as:     )9(,, 111   wwu  
where parameter  1,0  is the elasticity of substitution between profit and effort. The 
marginal utility of profit is constant but the marginal disutility of effort is increasing 
with the higher level of effort. The relative risk aversion equivalent coefficient of this 
utility function is given by  1 . The   is the disutility parameter; its value ensures 
that the utility function is jointly strictly quasi-concave. The representative banker’s 
utility maximization problem is: 
 
    
      3210 11
1
1..
,,max
aaa dfaq
pqaw
qpts
wu

 
 

 
The solutions to these problems give us the optimal level of effort as: 
    132 1* 1 0 11 1 (10)aaap a a a f d            
The variable *  is the optimal level of effort of a representative banker following 
liberalization. It depends on input and output prices, substitution parameter, technical 
parameters, and deposits and fixed assets per banking hour. Notice that the term  11 a   is the ratio of hourly income (profit and wages) earned to total revenue 
generated per hour by the representative banker, i.e., the proportion of revenue that the 
banker realises as income per hour.4 We assume that bankers’ motivation is positively 
associated with the reward they receive and the ratio
pq
w  1
 reflects this. Put 
differently, following liberalization, bankers are incentivized because their reward 
(relative income) is likely to improve, which motivates them to exert more effort. 
Substituting the optimal level of effort (10) into the technical production function (1), 
we get: 
31 2 (11)Q BN F D 
 
and the share parameters are 
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1
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(14)
1
a
a
a
a
a
a
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 
 
 
 
 
 
Whereas equation (1) is a technical relationship between inputs and output, equation 
(11) additionally captures bankers’ optimal responses (efforts) to regulatory changes. 
We call (11) bankers’ optimally feasible production function. Although si  are 
empirically different from isa , nonetheless
3
1
1i
i
  , which continues to preserve the 
CRTS assumption. The parameters of the technical production function, 3,2,1, iai , 
and optimally feasible production function, 3,2,1, ii , are related through the 
substitution parameter  .5 The technical production function (1) contains an 
unobservable input, N , whereas the optimally feasible production function (11) is 
defined over all observable inputs (N, F and D). The effort parameter is now embedded 
into the optimal productivity parameter, B, which captures the bankers’ optimal 
response to reforms and liberalization. The banking sector’s optimal productivity 
parameter, B , is given by: 
     1 11 1 11 11 1 11 10 1 11 1 (15)a aa a aa aB a a p a                   
In equation (15) the bankers’ effort (incentive) driven productivity ( incB ) is captured by 
the term:     )16(1 1111  aainc apB   
incB  is directly affected by the reform-induced changes in the input and output prices 
that shape the incentive structure of the banking sector. As discussed above, the term   11 a   – the bankers’ income relative to the total revenue per hour – is the key 
element of incentive-driven productivity.  The rest of the expression on the RHS of 
equation (15) is a constant term, which only has a scale effect on incB . Empirically, this 
scaling effect is close to unity (see below). If the banking sector productivity improves 
following liberalization, then we expect an evident positive trend in both incB  and B . 
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We now proceed to implement our proposed model and extract incB  and B , among other 
things, for a sample of Nepalese banks post-liberalization. 
3. Financial Regimes and Reforms in Nepal  
Nepal is one of the poorest countries of the world with a per capita income of 
current US$ 619. Nepal is landlocked and sandwiched between two giants of Asia, viz. 
China and India with over a billion populations each. Nepal has a population of 26.40 
million.6  
Nepal has a banking history of over three-quarters of a century – the country’s 
first ever commercial bank was established in 1937 followed by the establishment of 
the Central Bank in 1956. However, the financial sector was under the firm grip of the 
authorities until the reforms that concluded in 1994. Only two commercial banks and 
one development bank operated until 1984 and the financial sector was largely dormant. 
Banking and financial sector policies were dominated by a socialist banking 
philosophy, similarly to those in India (Burgess and Pande, 2005).  
Nepal Rastra Bank (the Central Bank of Nepal, henceforth NRB) operated a 
highly controlled regime of interest rate management: “there were about 20 controlled 
bank rates differentiated between sectors, use of funds and types of collaterals” (NRB, 
1996; p 50). The term structures of interest rates were fully controlled. A liquidity 
requirement of at least 25% – comprising a minimum of 5% of total deposit in 
government securities and a further 20% of other liquid assets including reserves at the 
Central Bank – was in operation. Commercial banks were barred from taking foreign 
currency deposits. A regime of directed credit programmes existed which made it 
mandatory for banks to channel as high as 25% of their total lending to the State-defined 
Priority Sectors, encompassing agriculture, cottage industries, exports etc. Interest rates 
on Priority Sector lending were always set at low levels and commercial banks were 
penalised if they did not meet the target of directed credit of 25%.  
Nepal, for the first time ever in 1984, allowed a very limited access (entry) to 
joint venture (in a joint investment with Nepalese investors) branches of foreign banks 
in the country, primarily to ease foreign transactions associated with international trade. 
This led to the establishment of three foreign joint venture banks under foreign 
management – Nepal Arab Bank Limited, Nepal Indo Swiss Bank, Nepal ANZ 
Grindlays Bank – making a total of five commercial banks. This was followed by the 
first phase of financial liberalization (1986-1989) which mainly focussed on interest 
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rate liberalization. NRB somewhat deregulated its interest rate policy in August 1989 – 
banks and financial institutions were given some freedom in setting their deposit and 
lending rates. The first phase of liberalization, although it offered some freedom in 
interest rate setting, generated few discernible changes in banking activities in Nepal. 
The second phase of financial liberalization, which started in 1992, aimed at deep and 
far reaching changes. It focussed on foreign exchange liberalization and opening up of 
the financial sector. Nepalese currency was made fully convertible into current accounts 
in 1993 and measures of capital account liberalization were adopted. Commercial banks 
were authorized to issue credit in foreign currencies; foreign investors could expatriate 
100% profit to their habitat. Most importantly, the private sector could enter into the 
banking and financial sector with ease and with or without foreign participation. This 
episode of reform concluded in 1994. 
This second phase of liberalization consolidated reforms and fully opened up 
the financial sector, which led to deep structural changes and a restructuring of the 
Nepalese financial sector. The number of commercial banks increased more than 
threefold – from 10 in 1995 to 31 in 2013. The number of development banks reached 
88 from only three in 1995. Furthermore, a whole host of new types of financial 
institution have proliferated which either did not exist or had no significant presence 
pre-1994 reform. They include 69 Finance Companies, 24 Microfinance Development 
Banks, 16 Savings and Credit Co-operatives, and 36 NGOs (financial intermediaries).7  
The old and large banks also went through deep restructuring. Nepal Bank Limited and 
Rastriya Banijya Bank, the two oldest and largest commercial banks of the country, 
respectively, had as high as 56% and 60% of their total loan portfolio classed as non-
performing in 2002; both banks had reduced their non-performing loan to around 6% 
by 2012. Given the scale of structural transformation and the restructuring of the 
financial sector following the 1992-1994 episode of liberalization, Nepal makes an 
interesting test case for the financial reforms-led bankers’ effort and productivity 
growth in the banking sector, and we examine this through our analytical model 
presented in section 2.  
4. Econometric Specification and Data 
The analytical model presented in Section 2 derives the optimal level of 
incentivized effort ( * ) of a banker following liberalization, which is embedded in the 
optimally feasible production function (11). In order to compute bankers’ incentivized 
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optimal productivity, we need to estimate the structural parameters ( 1 , 2 and 3 ) of 
production function (11). The log-linearized auxiliary regression of (11), for a panel of 
banks, takes the following form:  
1 2 3log log log log (17)it i t i it i it it itQ N F D e           
 (i= 1,…,M; and t=1,…,T). 
Specification (17) is a fixed effects panel model. The subscripts “i” and “t” denote the 
cross-sectional and time series dimensions, respectively; i captures the bank-specific 
fixed effects and t captures the time effects. Since the regression is specified in 
logarithms, the parameters are elasticities. Equation (17) specifies parameters as bank 
(panel unit) specific. In the estimation we allow both for the heterogeneity (bank-
specific) and the homogeneity (industry-wide) of parameters across panel units.  All 
parameters are expected to resume positive signs a priori and one would expect the 
point estimate (elasticity) of total deposit liabilities to be by far the largest in a bank’s 
production function.  
We have obtained complete and consistent quarterly data for 12 major 
commercial banks of Nepal directly from the office of the Governor of NRB. Although, 
there were 31 commercial banks in operation in 2013, most of them were small and 
very new; all 19 banks excluded from the analyses came into operation post-2007. Their 
short life (data span) precluded them from any credible econometric analysis. Of the 12 
sample banks, seven started their operation around the mid-1990s.8 Due to the short 
lifespan of the majority of banks in the sample, it is not possible to split the sample 
between the pre- and post-liberalization periods. Moreover, it is important to note that 
our analytical model presumes a liberalized and deregulated environment. Banks do not 
have a free hand to maximize their profitability under a regulated (repressed) regime. 
Therefore, computations of optimal effort and productivity that we derived analytically 
in Section 2 are only appropriate under a fully deregulated banking system – i.e., the 
post-1994 regime in Nepal. Our sample of 12 banks accounts for well over 66% of the 
banking activities of the country, hence deemed sufficient to discern whether reforms 
and liberalization have increased bankers’ efforts and banking sector productivity in 
Nepal. Data series include individual banks’ total deposits (D), total loans and advances 
(L), investments (I), fixed assets (F), interest expenses on deposits (RE), interest income 
(RY), bank staff (NB), staff expenses (NE), other operating expenses (OE) and 
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operating profit ( ). The relevant nominal variables are deflated by CPI as the 
deflator.9  We have an unbalanced panel of 420 quarterly observations covering a period 
of 11 years – 2002(Q1) to 2012(Q1).  
We would have liked to cover the period from 1994, when the second phase of 
liberalization concluded, but data constraints became binding. The NRB stated that 
quarterly data for all banks did not go that far back and made data available since 
2002(Q1). Further, as discussed above, banking activities remained lacklustre until 
2000 due to Maoist insurgency, which had launched an armed rebellion (People’s War) 
in 1996. When Maoist rebels entered into dialogue for peace post-2000, financial 
activities soared, ushering fundamental changes into the country’s financial sector. 
Hence, our sample arguably covers the most intense period of financial activities in 
post-liberalization Nepal.     
5. Empirical Methodology 
Macro-panel data of this nature are widely reported to be non-stationary (unit 
root) processes (see, among others, Luintel et al., 2008), requiring an application of 
non-stationary panel data econometrics in estimating the parameters of (17). Panel unit 
root and panel cointegration tests are shown to have better power properties than the 
time series tests in small or moderate samples.  
A number of panel unit root tests are proposed in the literature which can be 
summarized as the first and second generation tests. The former assume cross-sectional 
independence – a prickly issue in macro panel data – while the latter allow for cross-
sectional dependence. The frequently applied first generation panel unit root tests in the 
empirical literature include those of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003; hereafter IPS), Fisher-
ADF (Maddala and Wu, 1999) and Hadri (2000). The IPS test tests the null of a unit 
root for each cross-sectional unit against the alternative that only a fraction of cross-
sectional units may contain a unit root.  This test does not maintain stationarity across 
all groups under the alternative hypothesis. Further, it also allows for the heterogeneity 
of persistence, dynamics and error variance across groups.  
The Fisher-ADF test employs the p-values of a unit root test. Under the null of 
a unit root for all M (cross-sectional) units, the quantity: 
1
log( )
M
i
i
  is asymptotically 
2
2M ; where i is the p-value of the unit root test on the ith series of the ith panel unit. 
Hadri’s test tests the null of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root; a common 
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persistence parameter is assumed across all cross-sectional units. Hadri also derives 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent LM tests under the null of stationarity. 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2006), however, warn that Hadri’s tests suffer from size 
distortion in the presence of autocorrelations.  
The second generation tests are relatively new and are gaining momentum in 
empirical applications for obvious reasons. Gengenbach et al. (2010) show that the 
cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test (Pesaran, 2007) is one of the powerful 
second generation panel unit root tests. This test accounts for both cross-sectional 
dependence and residual serial correlation while testing for the null of a unit root. For 
the sake of robustness, we employ IPS, Fisher-ADF, Hadri and the truncated CIPS tests 
on each of the data series of our panel.  
Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999), among others, propose panel cointegration tests 
to explore if non-stationary panel data form a linear cointegrating (long-run 
equilibrating) relationship.  They are residual-based tests of cointegration – extensions 
of the time series tests of Engle and Granger (1987) on panel settings. Pedroni (ibid.) 
proposes seven tests of panel cointegration – four of them are within-dimension tests 
that assume homogeneous cointegrating vectors across panel units and the remaining 
three are between-dimension tests (referred to as Group Mean Statistics), which allow 
for heterogeneous cointegrating vectors across panel units. The between-dimension 
estimators exhibit lower size distortions than the within-dimension estimators and the 
group t-statistic is shown to be the most powerful one amongst the three between-
dimension panel cointegration tests (Pedroni, 2004). The Kao (1999) test is similar to 
Pedroni’s tests except that Kao allows for heterogeneous intercepts but assumes 
homogeneous slope parameters across panel units.  We report a range of cointegration 
tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) so that we could reach a robust 
conclusion on the cointegrating relationship vis-à-vis our institutional production 
function. 
The OLS level regressions, employed to test cointegration in the panel, are not 
informative of the significance or otherwise of the cointegrating vectors because of the 
well-known inference problems (cf. Engle and Granger, 1987). Therefore, we estimate 
the cointegrating parameters through Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS; Phillips and 
Hansen, 1990) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS; Stock and Watson, 1993; Kao et al., 1999).  
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6. Empirical Results 
 Results of panel unit root tests are reported in Table 1. The first three columns 
pertain to the first generation of panel unit root tests. The IPS and ADF-Fisher tests do 
not reject the null of a unit root for any of the level series in the panel. Hadri’s test 
decisively rejects the null of level stationarity. Both types of first generation tests (those 
testing the null of a unit root and the null of stationarity) reveal that our panel data are 
non-stationary. This is further confirmed by the CIPS – a second generation – test which 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence. CIPS tests cannot reject the null of unit root 
for any of the data series in our panel.  The results in Table1 are based on the most 
general specifications, which include cross section-specific intercepts and linear trends. 
All individual series in the panel are found to be first-difference stationary, signifying 
that our panel data series are unit root processes.10   
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 reports the results of panel cointegration tests on bankers’ optimally 
feasible production function (11). Both the between-dimension and the within-
dimension tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) are reported. These tests are performed 
under two deterministic settings: (i) bank-specific constant only, and (ii) bank-specific 
constants and linear time trend. We also report the panel cointegration tests proposed 
by Kao (1999) for the sake of robustness. We attach more importance to the between-
dimension tests and, particularly, the Pedronit test , which is shown to have better power 
properties. 
Table 2 about here 
  The null of non-cointegration of bankers’ log linearized institutional production 
function (17) is decisively rejected by all the tests reported in Table 2. The precision of 
these tests is very high and the results are robust to different test methods that vary 
considerably in their underlying assumptions. Overall, there is strong empirical support 
for the bankers’ optimally feasible production function as a long-run equilibrium 
relationship.  
  Estimates of the cointegrating parameters (vectors) are reported in Table 3. 
Results show that two covariates of institutional production function, namely the bank 
staff and the total deposit liabilities, appear positively signed and highly significant 
across all specifications, which is consistent with a priori expectations. The stock of 
total fixed assets, however, shows mixed results. It appears positive and statistically 
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significant under pooled (within-dimension) estimators but insignificant under Grouped 
(between-dimensions) estimators. The insignificance of total fixed assets is somewhat 
surprising but this may be partly explained by the relative constancy (the lack of 
sufficient variation) of fixed assets in these banks.11  
Table 3 about here 
One of the fundamental assumptions of our analytical model is that the bankers’ 
production function follows CRTS. We explicitly test this restriction and report the 
results in row 1 . In no case is the CRTS restriction rejected by the data. We re-estimate 
two (Grouped) specifications by dropping the insignificant log itF  variable and re-
assessing the CRTS assumption. Results show that CRTS is maintained.  
On balance, one would prefer the between-dimension FMOLS estimates of 
industry-wide parameters because they allow share parameters to differ across 
individual banks. The within-dimension (Pooled) estimates treat the share parameters 
as being the same across all banks. In view of the significance of all three covariates, 
we report simulation results based on the pooled FMOLS estimates; however, the 
qualitative nature of our simulation results is robust, irrespective of the set of 
parameters used. 
It is important to note that although the CRTS is not rejected statistically, the 
sum of the point estimates of the within-dimension estimates under FMOLS amounts 
to 1.049 rather than 1.0 but we need parameters to sum exactly to unity for simulations. 
Since the sum of these point estimates is 4.9% higher than unity, we scaled down all 
three parameters by 4.9% each and tested whether this restriction is data acceptable. 
Indeed, we find the scaled down parameters of 1 0.057  , 2 0.027   and 3 0.916  , 
which sum to unity, are data acceptable – a test of these parametric restrictions as the 
cointegrating vector generates a p-value of 2 (3) 0.110   under the null. We use these 
data congruent parameters which pass CRTS restrictions and sum to unity for 
simulations.12 
7. Bankers’ Incentive and Bank Productivity 
In order to simulate the bankers’ optimal level of effort (10) and the incentivized 
optimal productivity (15), we need solutions for the parameters of technical production 
function (1) – 0, 1 2 3, ,a a a a ; the elasticity of substitution, ; the disutility parameter,  ; 
and the series of input and output prices – 1 2 3, ,w w w and p . We use the CRTS consistent 
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estimates of 1 0.057  , 2 0.027  and 3 0.916  as the structural parameters of 
production function (11). Given the restriction  1,0 , some iterations reveal that for 0.40,0.55  the system robustly converges, hence we report the simulations 
pertaining to 51.0 . The parametric value of 51.0  combined with equations (12), 
(13) and (14) and the point estimates of i s  provide solutions to the technical 
parameters: 1 0.110a  , 2 0.025a   and 3 0.865a  . The remaining parameters   and 0a
are related through the equilibrium condition
321
3210
1
aaa
aaaa
 . Since all 
denominators are constants, we set 10 a  which gives 1.586  . 13 The disutility 
parameter has a scale effect on the optimal level of effort ( * ) and productivity ( B ). 
Simulations conveniently converge for ]4.0,09.0[  hence we employ 10.0 . 
Iterations reveal that for wide-ranging values of 0.01 10   the simulated values of
*  and B remain fairly robust. 
The marginal cost of bank staff ( 1w ) is proxied by the average hourly wage rate 
of a banker in 12 sample banks. Each bank employee is assumed to work 40 hours per 
week and there are 48 bank working weeks per year giving, on average, 12 bank 
working weeks per quarter.14 However, the simulated results remain robust to hourly 
wages based on 36-44 working hours per week and/or 13 weeks per quarter. The unit 
cost (shadow price) of total fixed assets ( 2w ) for the ith bank is taken to be the deposit 
weighted market (market for the ith bank is defined as all the banks in the sample except 
the ith bank) interest (one year fixed deposit) rate. The unit cost of deposits ( 3w ) is the 
average deposit rate (total interest payment on deposits/total deposits) for each bank. 
The unit output price ( p ) is computed as the ratio of loan interest income to total bank 
loan (i.e. the average unit price of a bank loan). Using the above parameter values and 
input-output prices, we simulate, among others, bankers’ optimal level of effort, effort-
driven productivity, average input cost and revenue per unit of bank output, and the 
spread for the banking industry.  
Figure 1 plots the banking sector’s average input cost per unit of output, average 
output price and the bank spread (banks’ unit output price minus the unit input price). 
This is also the measure of bank profit per unit of aggregate bank output. The average 
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input cost per unit of output is calculated as { }iai
i
w   from equation (6) and the 
average output price ( p ) is as defined above. These average unit cost-price measures 
are per Nepalese rupee of bank output (i.e. the rental cost of inputs to produce one rupee 
of bank output and the price of that output).15 Commercial banks’ average cost and 
average revenue (price per unit of output) have changed over the years – both have 
increased. Plots indicate that the bank spread declined during 2003(Q3) - 2004(Q4); it 
then slightly picked up in 2005(Q1) and remained at a higher level until 2006(Q4); 
subsequently it narrowed down a little until 2010(Q4) and again slightly opened up 
thereafter. Our calculations show an average spread of 3.25 percentage points for the 
whole period (2003-2011); 3.3 percentage points for 2003-2008 and 3.17 percentage 
points for 2009-2011. Nepalese commercial banks’ spread appears to have narrowed 
down in recent years indicating competitive pressure. One striking feature is that since 
2008(Q4) the bank spread has become smaller than the input cost per unit of output. 
This suggests that while banks have managed to hold on to their spread by transmitting 
costs to their customers, the banking services in general have become considerably 
more expensive in Nepal in recent years. The overall cost of banking, measured by the 
average cost and price per unit of bank output, shows a positive upward trend in recent 
years. 
Bankers’ optimal effort index, plotted in Figure 2, shows some fluctuations, but 
the overall trend is clearly an upward one. During the initial years (2004-2006), the 
optimal effort index shows a sharp rise but it decelerates quite sharply for a brief period 
from 2007(Q1) - 2007(Q4). The effort index then recovers and shows a rapid rise since 
2009(Q3). Overall, the optimal level of bankers’ effort appears to have increased by 
43% by the end of 2011 compared to its level in 2004. Plots also reveal that the banks’ 
actual profit increases sharply, peaking at 70% higher in 2010 than its 2004 level. The 
index of actual output (loans and investment) peaks during 2008-2009 at 46% higher 
than its 2004 level. The bank output index decelerates during 2009(Q3) - 2010(Q1) and 
then shows signs of slow recovery thereafter. The profit index takes a dip in 2010(Q3). 
These recent declines in output and profit indices are due to the slump in Nepal’s real 
estate market which began in 2008 and has yet to turn its corner. Despite some dents in 
profitability, the optimal effort index shows a continuous rise. 
The banking sector’s total optimal incentivized productivity ( B ) is plotted in 
Figure 3. We also plot the unscaled component of B , which is incB , just to illustrate that 
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scaling really does not matter in capturing the productivity trend. In fact, the scaling 
factor on the RHS of equation (15) resumes a value of 1.013, which implies that the 
role of technical parameters in our measure of incentive (effort) driven optimal 
productivity is virtually nil (these parameters are treated as fixed). The optimal 
productivity shows a clear positive trend during the whole period of post-liberalization 
under analyses with a sharp blip in 2006(Q1). This sharp rise in productivity is credited 
to the Peace Accord of 2005 between the war waging Maoists and the political parties 
of Nepal which effectively ended the People’s War. The cessation of Maoists’ 
insurgency reduced uncertainty which led a sharp upturn in banking activity (also see 
Figure 2) and productivity.16 During the post-liberalization period under analysis, the 
Nepalese banking sector’s productivity appears to have increased by around 1% a year, 
on average.  
The derivation of incentive-driven optimal productivity (B) treats technical 
parameters as constants.17 However, technology changes over time. It is, therefore, 
important to establish what proportion of the banking sector TFP (total factor 
productivity), measured by Solow Residuals using the CRT consistent s , is accounted 
for by the bankers’ incentive-driven optimal productivity. Figure 4 plots the proportion 
of TFP accounted for by the incentive-driven productivity (B); the plot shows that this 
proportion is quite oscillatory. The proportion of TFP accounted for by B increased 
from around 41% to 47% during 2003-2008 however it then dropped to around 39% in 
2010 and recovered somewhat thereafter – the sample average is 43%.  
A comparison of the optimal effort index (in Figure 2) and optimal bank 
productivity (in Figure 3) reveals that during the initial years (2004-2006) both bankers’ 
efforts and bank productivity went hand-in-hand; they increased. However, during 
2007(Q1) - 2007(Q4), the effort index declines rather sharply, which coincides with the 
flat bank productivity. However, the effort index shows a rapid rise since 2009(Q3) 
which again coincides with a positive productivity trend, albeit somewhat less steep. 
One possible explanation of the relatively slower productivity growth is that after some 
initial years of productivity push, bankers’ effort may have focussed on quantity 
(volume). This is borne out by the sharp rise in the volumes of deposits and credits post 
2010(Q2) which are plotted in Figure 5. These sharp rises in deposits and credits are at 
the backdrop of the fall in their volumes during 2008(Q3) - 2009(Q4). 
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Finally, we formally test if the bankers’ effort statistically explains the 
incentivized productivity by regressing the index of optimal total productivity on the 
index of bankers’ effort. Both OLS and Instrumental Variables estimates reveal that 
bankers’ effort significantly explains the optimal bank productivity. A 1% increase in 
bankers’ effort increases the banking sectors’ optimal total productivity by roughly 
0.33%.18  
 
8. Conclusion 
A large body of literature examines whether banking sector efficiency and 
productivity improves following financial deregulation and reforms, as the proponents 
of such policies claim. The literature mainly employs non-parametric DEA to 
investigate some of these issues. We model commercial banks as profit-cum-utility 
maximizing firms in a parametric approach. Our approach differs from DEA, hence 
complements the literature. We provide a micro-founded general framework for the 
analyses of bankers’ optimal level of effort (self-motivated incentive) and effort-driven 
productivity following financial liberalization and deregulation of banks.  We proxy ex 
post bank risk through the ratio of non-performing bank loans. Our analytical model 
also captures issues such as unit prices of banks’ inputs and output, optimal wages, 
bank spread and the overall cost of bank services. They are issues of relevance in 
judging the successes and/or failures of liberalization and reform policies. 
 As a test case, we empirically implement our model to scrutinize a panel of 
Nepalese commercial banks and evaluate if deregulations and reforms have worked in 
Nepal. Nepal concluded her deep financial reforms in 1994, which has profoundly 
transformed the country’s banking and financial system. Using the analytical tools of 
our model, we find that financial liberalization has made Nepalese bankers more effort 
oriented – evidence shows a clear rise in the level of bankers’ efforts following 
liberalization. Nepalese bankers’ optimal level of effort has increased considerably (by 
43% during the period under analysis) and appears on an upward trajectory, albeit at a 
slower pace. Likewise, the banking sector’s effort (incentive) driven productivity has 
also risen by 1% a year, on average, post-liberalization (2003-2012). The association 
between the optimal levels of effort and optimal productivity seemed very close in the 
early years of liberalization but appeared somewhat opaque in later years. Prima facie 
evidence suggests that after the initial years of productivity push, bankers might have 
focussed on quantity (volume) rather than quality (productivity). Nonetheless, formal 
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tests show that the bankers’ optimal effort significantly explains the banking sector’s 
optimal productivity in Nepal. Our calculations show that effort-driven productivity 
accounts for slightly over 40% of banking sector TFP (measured by Solow Residuals) 
in Nepal. Remarkably, the overall proportion of performing loans to total loans has 
increased from 76% in 2003 to over 96% in 2012.19 
Finally, we find that Nepalese banks earned an average bank spread (profit per 
unit of bank output) of 3.25 percentage points during the sample period but this has 
slightly declined in recent years (3.17 percentage points), perhaps reflecting the 
competitive pressure. However, a downside is that the banking services in Nepal have 
become costly in recent years – the average cost and price per unit of bank output has 
increased notably. The latter is, however, not unexpected, given that deregulation 
abolishes authorities’ control on interest rates and various concessionary lending 
programmes. Overall, financial liberalization and reforms have been a good experience 
for Nepal, especially from the perspectives of more incentivized (effort-oriented) 
bankers, increased optimal productivity and higher volume of deposits, credit and bank 
profitability. We hope our proposed model (analytical framework) and the test case 
study prove useful and motivating for extending this strand of research. 
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Table 1: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
 IPS 
[W-Stat] 
ADF-Fisher 
[Chi-Square] 
Hadri 
[Consistent Z-
stat] 
CIPS 
 
lnQ 
 
0.898 0.374 0.000 -0.246 
lnN 
 
0.914 0.930 0.000 -0.164 
lnF 
 
0.326 0.401 0.000 -0.360 
lnD 
 
0.542 0.369 0.000 -0.371 
For all tests, except for the CIPS, P-values under the null are reported. For CIPS t-
ratios  are  reported.   The  5%  critical  value  for the CIPS test for T/M (200/15) is -
2.25; where T is the sample size and M is the cross-section units. The null under all 
test statistics, except that of Hadri, is unit root; the latter tests the null of stationarity. 
The sample consists of 420 unbalanced panel observations. In all tests, constant and 
linear time trends are included as exogenous variables. Given the quarterly data, the 
lag length is set to 4 for all tests except the CIPS where second order lag is used. CIPS 
requires lead and lag augmentations. W-Stat is the standardized NTt test of IPS. ADF-
Fisher tests are 2 (24)-distributed. The Hadri test is computed using Newey-West 
bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel; heteroskedasticity-consistent Z-statistics are 
reported. CIPS is the cross-sectionally augmented IPS tests (a second generation test). 
The variable mnemonics are: lnQ = log of real total loan and investment (output 
measure), lnN = log of number of bank staff, lnF = log of total fixed assets in real 
terms, lnD = log of total deposits in real terms.  
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Table 2: Results of Panel Cointegration Tests 
 Between Dimension (Group Mean) Within Dimension (Pooled) 
 i  &i t   i  &i t   
Pedroni test   -4.835(0.000)a -2.995(0.001) a -6.146(0.000) a -4.817(0.000) a 
Pedronit test  -11.922(0.000) a -12.732(0.000) a -9.755(0.000) a 12.839(0.000) a 
KAOt test  NA NA -19.183(0.000) a NA 
Pedroni test   and Pedronit test  are panel rho- and ADF-statistics of Pedroni (1999); 
KAOt test is the tADF -statistic of Kao (1999). Columns i  and &i t   indicate the 
deterministic component in the model, namely, constants (fixed effects) only, and 
constants and linear time trends. Lag lengths are based on SIC information criteria. 
Superscripts “a” denote significance at 1% or better. Kao test statistics are a within-
dimension test which allows fixed effects only, hence NAs in three columns.  
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Table 3: Estimated Cointegrating Parameters 
 1 2 3log log log logit i t it it it itQ N F D e           (11) 
 FMOLS DOLS 
 Grouped Pooled Grouped Pooled 
1  0.146a 
(0.000) 
0.115 a 
(0.005) 
0.060 b 
(0.050) 
0.214 a 
(0.002) 
0.136 a 
(0.005) 
0.060 b 
(0.041) 
2  -0.013 
(0.673) 
 
- 
0.028 b 
(0.039) 
-0.053 
(0.240) 
 
- 
0.033 a 
(0.010) 
3  0.888 a 
(0.000) 
0.891a 
(0.000) 
0.961 a 
(0.000) 
0.800 a 
(0.000) 
0.848 a 
(0.000) 
0.937 a 
(0.000) 
       
1  0.686 0.900 0.126 0.625 0.758 0.344 
 
FMOLS is the fully Modified OLS of Phillips and Hansen (1990) as shown in Panel 
setting by Pedroni (2001).  DOLS is the Dynamic OLS as described in Kao et al. (1999). 
Given their significance, both deterministic terms (bank specific constants and linear 
time trends) are retained in the estimation. Figures within parentheses (.) are p-values 
under the null. 1 reports the P-values of the test of the null of CRTS, i.e., 
1 2 3 1     ; the test statistic is 2 (1)  distributed. Under the between-dimension 
specifications log itF appears insignificant; we also report results excluding this 
insignificant covariate. Superscripts “a” and “b” denote significance at 1% and 5% or 
better.   
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Figure 1: Average input cost, output price and spread (industry) 
 
 
Industry implies the banking sector, comprised of 12 sample banks. The average input 
cost per unit of output is calculated as { }iai
i
w   from equation (6). The average output 
price is the average loan rate computed as the ratio of loan interest income over total 
bank loan. The average input cost, output price and spread (profit) are per unit of bank 
output. In the vertical axis 0.1 means ten paisa. One Nepalese rupee consists of 100 
paisa. 
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Figure 2: Industry optimal effort index (2004=100), actual output index and actual 
profit Index. 
 
 
Industry implies the banking sector, comprised of 12 sample banks. Output and profit 
index are actual figures for the banking sector. The optimal effort index is the simulated 
series, equation (10).  
 
  
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
130 
140 
150 
160 
170 
180 
2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 
Ind output Index 
Ind optimal effort Index 
Ind pProfit Index 
28 
 
Figure 3: Banking Sector’s Optimal Productivity: ( B  ) and ( incB ) 
 The banking industry implies 12 sample banks. The banking sector’s optimal 
productivity ( B ) is as in equation (15) and unscaled, incB , as in equation (16). Plots are 
absolute figures not indices. 
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Figure 4: Proportion of TFP (measured by Solow Residuals) explained by 
the incentive-driven productivity (B). 
 
 
The industry implies the banking sector comprised of 12 sample banks. The banking 
sector’s Solow Residual-based TFP is computed using the   parameters of institutional 
production function (equation (11)). The incentive-driven optimal total productivity, B
, is defined in equation (15). 
 
 
Figure 5: Total Credits and Deposits of Commercial Banks, Millions of Rupees 
(2004-2012). 
 
The industry implies a banking sector comprised of 12 sample banks. Plots are actual 
total deposits and credits of the 12 sample banks. 
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1
 Some of these studies subsequently employ parametric methods to model the 
productivity and efficiency measures computed through DEA.  
2
 The non-zero profit in the long-run raises the theoretical possibility of banks 
producing an infinite amount of output. While we acknowledge this theoretical  
possibility, we do not regard it as being of much practical relevance.  
3
 Lack of data prevented us from using the off-balance-sheet items in our measure of 
bank output. However, our measure of bank output is consistent with those of Delis et 
al. (2011), among others.   
4
 To see this, equation (8) gives per hour profit to total revenue ratio,   1
pq
. 
And from pqaw 11  , one can derive the per hour effort augmented wage income to 
total revenue ratio, 11 apq
w  . Hence, the term  11 a   is simply equal to 
pq
w  1
, i.e. the ratio of per hour income to per hour total revenue. 
  
5
 It is trivial to show from (12), (13) and (14) that:  111 11  a , 
      1122 111a  and       1133 111a . 
6
 Data on GDP per capita in current US dollars are for 2011 and obtained from the 
World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nepal; accessed in Oct 2013. 
Population figures are from the 2011 census, Nepal.  
7
 Figures on the growth of financial institutions are taken from Banking and Financial 
Statistics, mid-July, 2012, No. 58, NRB.  
 
8
 The 12 commercial banks covered are: Bank of Kathmandu Ltd. (1995), Everest 
Bank Ltd. (1994), Global Bank Ltd. (2007), Himalayan Bank Ltd. (1993), Kumari 
Bank Ltd. (2001),  Laxmi Bank Ltd. (2002), Machhapuchchhre Bank Ltd. (2000), 
Nabil Bank Ltd. (1984), Nepal Bank Ltd. (1937),  Nepal Investment Bank Ltd. 
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(1986), Rastrya Banijya Bank Ltd. (1966) and Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Ltd. 
(1987). Figures within parentheses (.) indicate the date of bank operation.  
 
9
 Data on quarterly GDP deflator are not available in Nepal.  
10
 Results of first difference stationarity are not reported, to conserve space, but are 
available on request.  
11
 The fixed assets of banks tend to change slowly compared to bank output, 
employment and total deposit liabilities. 
12
 The parameter estimates of the last column of DOLS results reported in Table 3 
sum to 1.03. A reduction of 3.0% of each parameter to make them sum to unity is also 
not rejected by the test. The p-value of the test is 2 (3) 0.194  . The Grouped 
parameters under FMOLS and DOLS sum to 1.006 and 0.984, respectively (columns 
which delete the insignificant itF ). 
13
 Parameter 0a  is the constant term of the technical production function (equation 
(1)). The estimates of the constant term of the production function (11) range between 
0.024 to 2.498 under different specifications (not reported in Table 3). Our simulation 
results are robust to values of 00 10a  . 
14
 The average hourly wage rate ( 1w ) is calculated as follows. First, the quarterly 
average wage bill for staff is computed by dividing the total quarterly wage bill by the 
total number of staff.  Then the quarterly average wage bill is divided by 40x12; 
where 40 represents the hours worked per week and there are 12 working weeks in a 
quarter.  
15
 Nepalese currency is known as rupees and one rupee consists of 100 paisa.  
16
 We thank seminar participants at Nepal Banker’s Association, Kathmandu (2013) 
for this insight.  
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17
 A time varying approach of estimation would allow the technical parameter to be 
time dependent but data constraints preclude us from using it.   
18
 The estimated regression is: log 3.120 0.331log * 0.003sldmyB    ; where B is 
the index of simulated total optimal productivity, *  is the index of simulated 
optimal effort and ‘sldmy’ is the slope dummy for 2006(1)-(2) to capture the blip in 
productivity (see Figure 3). The constant term and the slope parameters resume p-
values of 0.000, 0.000 and 0.402, respectively, hence are statistically highly 
significant except for the slope dummy. The insignificance of the slope dummy 
implies the productivity blip of early 2006 is not due to the bankers’ effort. As 
discussed in page 20 (footnote 16) this is consistent with the exogenous factor – 
cessation of Maoist armed insurgency. The reported results pertain to the first order 
residual serial correlation (AR(1)) corrected IV estimates. The lagged value of * is 
used as instrument. The R-bar square is 0.59 and DW statistic is 1.96.  
19
  A time series plot of the ratio of performing to total loans and a brief commentary 
could be found in the earlier version of this paper listed as: “Reforms, Incentives and 
Banking Sector Productivity: A Case of Nepal;” Cardiff Working Paper No. 
E2014/14. 
